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Introduction 
 
 
Eurosceptics in the European Parliament 
Isolated and Divided in Brussels but Driving National Debates 
Daniela Kietz and Nicolai von Ondarza 
There is growing concern that Eurosceptic parties could fare very well in the May 2014 
European elections. Fears abound that the formation of a strong extreme right and right-
populist camp could endanger the functioning of the European Parliament and plunge 
the EU system into its next political crisis. But past experience with Eurosceptics points 
in a different direction. The Parliament will continue to function, but at the price of a 
further weakening of party-political polarisation. What the European Parliament does 
offer these parties, however, is an attractive public forum to exercise pressure and in-
fluence on national politics, which is their actual objective. Ultimately, it is national 
governing parties that take on board Eurosceptic ideas in fear of electoral defeat and 
transport them into the Union. 
 
Eurosceptic parties have been an integral 
part of European politics and the European 
Parliament (EP) for decades. They vary enor-
mously, on a political spectrum ranging 
from extreme right and right-populist to 
conservative and even left-wing. But now, 
for the first time, fundamentally sceptical 
formations on the right margins are seeing 
simultaneous growth in support in several 
states of western and northern Europe. 
Understood as a strong signal of loss of 
trust in the EU and its institutions in sig-
nificant parts of the European electorate, 
the impact of the rise of the Eurosceptics 
on political processes in the Parliament 
and the European Union becomes a deci-
sive question for the future of the Union. 
No Eurosceptic Front 
Contrary to the alarmist discourse of 
certain political leaders and parts of the 
media, there will be no Eurosceptic major-
ity to blockade the European Parliament. 
Neither the opinion polls nor parliamen-
tary practices would justify such fears. The 
Eurosceptic camp will grow only moder-
ately, while its heterogeneity will further 
weaken its impact. 
The influence of parties in the EP de-
pends strongly on their ability to join 
together in coherent political groups to 
access key posts and resources. Given that 
a political group requires a minimum of 
25 MEPs from at least seven member states, 
the right-wing Eurosceptic camp’s fragmen-
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 tation by ideological disagreements and 
competing nationalisms has always made 
this an enormous challenge. 
Currently we can identify at least three 
camps that will seek to form political 
groups after the elections. Firstly, the con-
servative Eurosceptics will seek to continue 
working together in the group of European 
Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) that 
split from the European People’s Party (EPP) 
at the beginning of the last legislature. It 
currently accounts for 57 of the 766 MEPs. 
However, the Czech Civic Democratic Party 
(ODS) and the British Conservatives are 
set to suffer major losses that even the ex-
pected gains for Jarosław Kaczyński’s Law 
and Justice (PiS) will be unable to compen-
sate. According to current polling (which 
needs to be interpreted with particular 
caution in relation to EU elections due to 
the differences between national voting 
systems) the ECR in its current composition 
would have only about 40 MEPs*. It has 
therefore already put out feelers to possible 
new partners such as the Alternative for 
Germany (AfD). 
To the right of the ECR two strongly 
fragmented groups of extreme right-wing 
and right-populist Eurosceptics compete 
for future political group status. Unlike the 
ECR, these parties are de facto excluded 
from the coalition-forming process by the 
other political groups. And in contrast 
to the moderate, reform-seeking ECR mem-
bers, many of these parties reject the EU 
on principle as undemocratic and bureau-
cratic. To them, the only legitimate venue 
for political decision-making is the nation-
state or region. The two groups centre 
around the United Kingdom Independence 
Party (UKIP) and the French Front National 
respectively. Both are expected to make 
strong gains and may even come first in 
their country’s EP elections. 
UKIP will attempt to reconstitute the 
only far-right political group in the current 
parliament, the Europe of Freedom and 
Democracy (EFD). With 31 MEPs from 12 
states it is currently the smallest political 
group. Its survival is dubious because in 
contrast to UKIP many of its mostly very 
small constituent parties, such as the 
Slovak National Party (SNS), have lost sup-
port and may not be represented in the 
next European Parliament. Moreover cer-
tain EFD members such as the Italian Lega 
Nord plan to join a new alliance. 
This second alliance is led by the Front 
National, whose expected strong gains in 
France give it a good chance of forming a 
political group of its own. The Dutch Party 
for Freedom (PVV) of Geert Wilders, the 
Austrian Freedom Party, the Lega Nord, 
the Belgian Vlaams Belang and the Sweden 
Democrats have all already pledged their 
support for this alliance, which has at-
tracted great media attention. In the cur-
rent legislature many of these parties could 
not agree with the EFD on forming a joint 
political group and remained non-attached. 
The formation of such a single political 
group by these forces remains unlikely, 
because UKIP in particular is very con-
cerned to distinguish itself from the tradi-
tional extreme right for domestic political 
reasons. This applies especially to the Front 
National, which Nigel Farage continues to 
regard as beyond the pale, despite its more 
moderate presentation under Marine Le 
Pen. Finally, both groups reject radical neo-
Nazi parties such as the Hungarian Jobbik 
and the Greek Golden Dawn, which are 
likely to remain non-attached. 
Taken together, this fragmented agglo-
meration of extreme right-wing and right-
populist parties could take about 80 of the 
751 seats in the next Parliament, according 
to current polls. Even if they were to ulti-
mately win more than that, they would still 
be a long way from a blocking majority. 
And even if these parties succeed in form-
ing political groups, their coherence can 
be expected to be extremely weak because 
their members rarely vote on the basis of 
shared joint positions. This will further 
reduce their political influence. 
If one includes the expected losses of 
the conservative ECR in the calculation, the 
polls indicate a shift towards the extreme 
right within the Eurosceptic camp rather 
*  For figures and 
calculations of future 
seat distribution see 
the four tables in the 
online file http://bit.ly/ 
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 than a massive overall boost. While this 
stronger representation will secure greater 
visibility for Eurosceptic positions, their 
overall influence in parliament will remain 
limited. 
Enforcing a Grand Coalition 
These shifts in the Eurosceptic camp will 
strengthen the trend towards grand coali-
tions, and to that extent indirectly affect 
the functioning of the EP. Coalition-form-
ing has always been more complex in the 
EP than at the national level; with seven 
political groups and no need to support a 
government, changing coalitions form for 
each vote. In 2009–2014 the dominant force 
in about 70 percent of votes was a grand 
coalition of EPP (274 MEPs) and European 
Social Democrats (S&D, 194). Only in about 
15 percent of cases respectively did a left- or 
right-of-centre coalition come into being, in 
both cases with the liberals (ALDE) as king-
makers. 
If the strength of the Eurosceptic parties 
grows – and potentially also the number 
of political groups – this trend is likely to 
be reinforced in the next Parliament. In 
the current legislature even the EPP already 
requires at least two partners (ALDE and 
ECR), if it wishes to avoid a grand coalition. 
Without the EPP, the Social Democrats 
need three partners (ALDE, Greens and 
European United Left). If the EPP in par-
ticular continues to refuse to work with the 
political group(s) on the far right, a grand 
coalition of EPP and S&D is likely to be the 
only viable option for a majority in the next 
Parliament. 
Thus, instead of polarising politically, 
the Parliament’s risks drifting ever further 
into the informal space of a grand coali-
tion. This is amplified by the tendency of 
parliamentarians to organise legislative 
processes almost exclusively through so-
called trialogues in which EP rapporteurs, 
European Commission officials and repre-
sentatives of the Council of Ministers nego-
tiate compromises behind closed doors that 
are then passed directly in first reading. This 
method grants the Parliament an efficient 
voice, albeit at the expense of transparency 
and political debate. Thus in 2013, 102 of 
114 legal acts were adopted in first reading. 
The combination of grand coalitions 
and informal policy-making denies the 
right-wing populists and Eurosceptics op-
portunities to influence Parliament. But at 
the same time this strategy torpedoes the 
Parliament’s long-standing goal of more 
strongly polarising EU politics on the left-
right spectrum, for example by having 
Europe-wide leading candidates (Spitzen-
kandidaten) for the European elections. As 
long as its decision-making is restricted to 
grand coalitions and trilogue agreements, 
the European Parliament will attract public 
attention above all when it operates as a 
single force in conflicts with the Commis-
sion or the member states. In the frag-
mented residual opposition the Euroscep-
tics could then present themselves to their 
clientele as the antithesis of the “Brussels 
elite”. At the same time the Parliament 
would move further away from fulfilling 
its function as a forum for political debates, 
which is so crucial for its democratic legiti-
macy. 
Leverage on National Politics 
Paradoxically, the rise of Eurosceptic parties 
has seen its gravest political repercussions 
not in the European Parliament but in the 
Council of Ministers. Whereas the tendency 
to form grand coalitions in the EP has large-
ly excluded the Eurosceptics, their electoral 
successes apply massive pressure on nation-
al governments. In response, governing 
parties increasingly pursue the strategy 
of adopting elements of the Eurosceptic 
agenda, which are then transported via 
national politics and the Council of Minis-
ters into the European Union. 
For instance, the growing popularity 
of UKIP has seen British policy on Europe 
under Prime Minister David Cameron re-
directed primarily towards winning back 
UKIP voters and hardliners within his Con-
servative Party. This is reflected nationally 
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 in the promise of a referendum on EU 
membership, but also affects EU politics 
directly in the form of obstructionism in 
the Council of Ministers and demands to 
return powers to the national level. The 
Dutch government, too, has responded to 
growing Euroscepticism with initiatives 
to restrict the EU’s powers. Similarly, the 
French and Danish initiatives to tempo-
rarily reintroduce border controls in the 
Schengen Area – which led to the 2013 
reform of the Schengen regime – also origi-
nated in domestic pressure exerted by the 
Front National and the Danish People’s 
Party. In this manner the Eurosceptics have 
been a driving force in recent years when it 
comes to challenging central pillars of the 
process of European integration. 
And precisely that is what most moti-
vates many right-populist Eurosceptic 
parties, whose real arena is the national 
political and public sphere. Representation 
in the European Parliament secures them 
vital financial resources and a political 
stage, especially for those parties not repre-
sented in their national parliaments. But 
many of their MEPs largely boycott parlia-
mentary processes for ideological reasons. 
The statistics speak for themselves: While 
they almost never serve as rapporteurs 
leading negotiations with Commission 
and Council of Ministers and only rarely 
prepare amendments, certain Eurosceptics 
make excessive use of media-grabbing oppo-
sition instruments such as parliamentary 
speeches and questions. In the current legis-
lature individual MEPs have made more 
than 700 speeches and asked 1,000 ques-
tions. A growing number of right-wing EU 
critics in the EP may increase these partly 
deliberate provocations and occasionally 
place questions concerning the limits of in-
tegration more firmly in the focus of Euro-
pean debates. But they will not be able to 
block the political decision-making processes 
in the EP. 
In view of the deepening of integration 
it is normal that Eurosceptic parties become 
established in many EU member states, as 
the integration process by its very nature 
agitates and divides. Their representation 
in the EP is ultimately also a sign of a func-
tioning democratic process. But the situa-
tion will become critical if approval of the 
integration process falls to a level where 
parties that completely reject the Union 
or their country’s membership receive as 
much support as they do in France and the 
United Kingdom, where UKIP and the Front 
National are polling 20 to 30 percent. 
The real political earthquake after the 
European elections will therefore strike 
first of all at the national level, before grad-
ually reverberating into European politics 
via the member states. In many countries 
the political forces of the centre are hope-
lessly devoid of strategies for dealing with 
such parties. France and the United King-
dom demonstrate perfectly how adopting 
their positions legitimises rather than 
weakens them. Instead of bolstering the 
positions of EU critics in this way, estab-
lished forces should de-demonise the anti-
Europe discourse, countering blanket rejec-
tion of the system with real debate about 
concrete political alternatives. 
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